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		 The	Labyrinth	of	Quantum	Theory		Tim	Maudlin		 	Quantum	 mechanics	 predicts	 many	 surprising	 phenomena,	 including	the	 two-slit	 interference	 of	 electrons.	 It	 has	 often	 been	 claimed	 that	these	 phenomena	 cannot	 be	 understood	 in	 classical	 terms.	 But	 the	meaning	 of	 “classical”	 is	 often	 not	 precisely	 specified.	 One	 might,	 for	example,	 interpret	 it	 as	 “classical	 physics”	 or	 “classical	 logic”	 or	“classical	 probability	 theory”.	 Quantum	mechanics	 also	 suffers	 from	 a	conceptual	difficulty	known	as	 the	measurement	problem.	Early	 in	his	career,	Hilary	Putnam	believed	that	modifications	of	classical	logic	could	both	 solve	 the	 measurement	 problem	 and	 account	 for	 the	 two-slit	phenomena.	 Over	 40	 years	 later	 he	 had	 abandoned	 quantum	 logic	 in	favor	of	 the	 investigation	of	various	theories—using	classical	 logic	and	probability	 theory—that	 can	 accomplish	 these	 tasks.	 The	 trajectory	from	Putnam’s	earlier	views	 to	his	 later	views	 illustrates	 the	difficulty	trying	 to	 solve	 physical	 problems	 with	 alterations	 of	 logic	 or	mathematics.		 	
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Introduction:	The	Siren	Song	of	Quantum	Theory		It	has	often	been	said	that	quantum	mechanics	is	mysterious	to	us	because	 it	 requires	 concepts	 that	 we	 cannot	 readily	 comprehend	 and	displays	behavior	 that	cannot	be	understood	 in	any	classical	way.	And	the	term	“classical”	in	this	dictum	has	been	taken	in	many	senses.	At	the	more	trivial	end	of	the	spectrum,	quantum	theory	is	incompatible	with	classical	Newtonian	mechanics,	which	 is	not	very	surprising.	But	some	claim	 that	 it	 is	 incompatible	 with	 a	 “classical”	 physical	 picture	 in	 a	broader	 sense,	 for	 example	 demanding	 the	 amalgamation	 of	 the	seemingly	 incompatible	 concepts	 of	 a	 particle	 and	 a	 wave.	 Classical	probability	 theory	 has	 been	 fingered	 as	 the	 culprit,	 with	 quantum	mechanics	 demanding	 negative	 probabilities.	 The	 “classical”	 idea	 that	there	must	exist	a	complete	description	of	the	physical	world	has	been	questioned.	And	in	the	most	extreme	variation,	“classical”	logic	has	been	called	into	question.	There	 has,	 from	 the	 beginning,	 been	 a	 penchant	 for	 wanting	quantum	theory	to	shock	our	whole	conceptual	system.	Niels	Bohr	was	fond	 of	 making	 gnostic	 pronouncements	 about	 the	 theory,	 and	 then	touting	 their	 very	 incomprehensibility	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 their	profundity.	He	is	quoted	by	his	son	as	saying	that	there	are	“two	sorts	of	truth:	profound	truths	recognized	by	the	fact	that	the	opposite	is	also	a	profound	truth,	in	contrast	to	trivialities	where	opposites	are	obviously	absurd”1.	 The	 Theory	 of	 Relativity	 certainly	 required	 a	 substantial																																									 							1	S.	Rozental	(ed.),	Niels	Bohr:	His	Life	and	Work	as	Seen	by	his	Friends	and	Colleagues	(Amsterdam:	North-Holland,	1967),	328.	
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conceptual	 retooling,	 but	 it	 never	 provoked	 this	 sort	 of	 oracular	commentary.		Are	the	phenomena	associated	with	quantum	theory	intrinsically	more	difficult	to	account	for	than	those	associated	with	Relativity?	It	is	said	that	the	deepest	mysteries	of	quantum	theory	are	illustrated	by	the	2-slit	 interference	 of	 electrons.	 If	 an	 electron	 beam	 is	 sent	 through	 a	single	slit	towards	a	fluorescent	screen,	there	will	be	a	somewhat	fuzzy	patch	that	lights	up	on	the	screen.	Close	that	one	and	open	a	slit	a	bit	to	the	right	and	the	patch	reappears	on	the	right.	But	with	both	slits	open	alternating	 light	 and	 dark	 bands	 appear,	 the	 signature	 of	 the	interference	 of	waves.	 Turn	 the	 source	 down	 until	 only	 one	 spot	 at	 a	time	 appears	 on	 the	 screen	 and	 the	 accumulated	 data	 still	 shows	 the	interference	 bands.	 Individual	 electrons	 seem	 to	 somehow	 interfere	with	themselves.	These	 phenomena	 are	 referred	 to	 as	 particle/wave	 duality.	Insofar	 as	 the	 interference	 bands	 emerge,	 the	 electron	 behaves	 like	 a	wave.	 Insofar	 as	 individual	 local	marks	 form	on	 the	 screen,	 it	 behaves	like	a	particle.	What	is	it	then?	A	wavicle?	What	does	that	mean?	Bohr’s	approach	was	to	point	to	the	experimental	environment.	In	some	circumstances	the	electron	behaves	like	a	particle,	in	others	like	a	wave,	 and	 never	 like	 both.	 In	 itself	 it	 is	 both	 or	 neither.	 Classical	concepts	 such	 as	 particle	 and	wave,	 or	 position	 and	momentum,	 only	have	content	 in	particular	experimental	 situations.	Furthermore,	 those	experimental	situations	may	exclude	each	other,	so	at	best	only	one	of	the	two	concepts	can	be	deployed	at	a	time.	Which	of	the	two	is	up	to	us.	Thus	the	doctrine	of	complementarity	was	born.	Our	puzzlement	about	
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quantum	theory	arises	from	the	habit	of	trying	to	use	both	concepts	at	the	same	time,	as	is	done	in	classical	physics.	This	narrative,	starting	with	experimental	results	and	ending	with	conceptual	 revolution,	 appears	 to	move	 smoothly	 from	 link	 to	 link.	 It	certainly	convinced	several	generations	of	physicists.	So	it	can	come	as	a	shock	 to	 see	 how	 flimsy	 the	 whole	 construction	 is.	 Almost	contemporaneously	 with	 the	 birth	 of	 quantum	 mechanics,	 Louis	 de	Broglie	 suggested	 understanding	 the	 formalism	 in	 terms	 of	 particles	guided	 by	 a	 “pilot	 wave”,	 which	 was	 represented	 by	 the	 quantum	wavefunction.	 De	 Broglie’s	 theory	was	 clear	 and	 comprehensible,	 and	adequate	to	explain	the	phenomena.	But	it	was	roundly	attacked	and	he	abandoned	it	for	many	decades.		What	was	so	objectionable	about	de	Broglie’s	approach?	Perhaps	it	was	distasteful	at	the	time	due	to	its	very	comprehensibility.	John	Bell	called	 such	 accounts	 of	 quantum	 phenomena	 “unromantic”,	 as	contrasted	with	the	bracing	radicalism	of	Bohr.	He	writes:	The	last	unromantic	picture	I	will	present	is	the	‘pilot	wave’	 picture.	 It	 is	 due	 to	 deBroglie	 and	 Bohm.	While	 the	founding	fathers	agonized	over	the	question	‘particle’	or	‘wave’	de	Broglie	in	1925	proposed	the	obvious	answer	‘particle’	and	‘wave’.	Is	 it	not	clear	from	the	smallness	of	the	scintillation	on	the	screen	that	we	have	to	do	with	a	particle?	And	is	it	not	clear	from	 the	 diffraction	 and	 interference	 patterns	 that	 the	motion	 of	 the	 particle	 is	 directed	 by	 a	 wave?....This	 idea	
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seems	 so	 natural	 and	 simple,	 to	 resolve	 the	wave-particle	dilemma	in	such	a	clear	and	ordinary	way,	that	it	is	a	great	mystery	to	me	that	it	was	so	generally	ignored.2		What	 I	 hope	 this	 little	 historical	 prologue	 indicates	 is	 the	seductiveness	 of	 the	 notion	 that	 quantum	 theory	 presents	 us	with	 an	even	 more	 radical	 break	 from	 “classical”	 patterns	 of	 thought	 and	explanation	than	Relativity’s	break	from	the	“classical”	account	of	space	and	 time.	 So	 seductive	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 rather	 plain	 and	 conceptually	clear	 solutions	 to	 puzzles	 have	 been	 ignored	 while	 ever	 more	outrageously	 baroque	 approaches	 are	 embraced.	 This	 pattern	appeared—for	 a	 definite	 and	 delimited	 time—in	 Hillary	 Putnam’s	consideration	of	quantum	theory.	This	is	the	story	of	that	episode.		Beginnings:	1965		 In	 1965,	 Putnam	 published	 two	 papers	 touching	 on	 quantum	theory:	 “Philosophy	 of	 physics”3	and	 “A	 philosopher	 looks	 at	 quantum	mechanics” 4 .	 Both	 of	 these	 pieces	 are	 notable	 for	 their	 clarity	concerning	the	main	problems	confronting	 the	 theory.	Putnam	focuses	almost	 entirely	 on	 what	 is	 called	 the	 measurement	 problem	 or	 the	problem	of	Schrödinger’s	cat.		The	standard	Copenhagen	interpretation,	associated	 with	 Bohr,	 is	 not	 a	 clear	 doctrine	 but	 it	 does	 have	 some	constantly	 repeated	 themes.	 One	 is	 that	 there	 is	 no	 “anschaulich”	 or																																									 							2	J.	S.	Bell,	Speakable	and	Unspeakable	in	Quantum	Mechanics	,	2nd	edition	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004),	191.	3	Reprinted	as	Chapter	5	in	Hilary	Putnam,	Mathematics,	Matter	and	Method	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1975),	79-92.	4	Reprinted	as	Chapter		7	in	Putnam,	Mathematics,	Matter	and	Method,	130-158.	
	 6	
“visualizable”	 picture	 of	 the	 microscopic	 realm	 that	 the	 theory	addresses.	 “Classical”	 intuitions	 and	 expectations	 fail	 there.	 But	 in	 a	curious	 twist,	 the	macroscopic	 realm	 of	 everyday	 experience	must	 be	described	 in	 “classical”	 terms.	 Not	 via	 classical	 physics,	 of	 course:	 if	classical	physics	could	account	for	the	behavior	of	macroscopic	objects	then	 it	would	be	 completely	 empirically	 adequate	 and	 there	would	be	no	 call	 to	 adopt	 quantum	 theory.	 But	 the	 basic	 classical	 vocabulary	 of	objects	 with	 both	 positions	 and	 velocities	 that	 move	 continuously	through	 space	 must	 be	 used	 for	 describing	 both	 the	 configuration	 of	experimental	 conditions	 and	 the	 outcomes	 of	 experiments.	 Those	outcomes,	 in	 turn,	 must	 depend	 on	 the	 microscopic	 realm	 somehow.	The	 main	 question	 was	 how	 to	 get	 a	 clear	 physical	 story	 about	 the	relationship	between	these	two	domains.	John	 von	 Neumann	 had	 famously	 presented	 an	 axiomatized	account	of	quantum	theory,	and	in	his	account	the	interface	between	the	microscopic	realm	of	atoms	and	the	macroscopic	realm	of	everyday	life	took	 a	 particularly	 shocking	 form.	 Von	 Neumann	 postulated	 two	completely	 different	 dynamical	 equations	 for	 the	wavefunction	 that	 is	used	to	represent	the	physical	state	of	a	quantum	system.	So	long,	von	Neumann	 said,	 as	 the	 system	was	not	measured,	 its	 evolution	was	 the	smooth,	 deterministic	 change	 given	 by	 Schrödinger’s	 equation.	 But	when	the	system	in	intervened	upon	by	a	measurement,	it	suddenly	and	unpredictably	 jumps	 into	 one	 of	 the	 eigenstates	 associated	 with	 the	operator	 that	 represents	 the	 measured	 quantity.	 The	 chances	 for	 the	different	possible	outcomes	are	given	by	Born’s	rule.	Here	are	von	Neumann’s	own	words:
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We	therefore	have	two	fundamentally	different	types	of	 interventions	 that	 can	 occur	 in	 a	 system	 S	 or	 in	 an	ensemble	 [S1,….,	 SN].	 First,	 the	 arbitrary	 changes	 by	measurements	 which	 are	 given	 by	 the	 formula	 (1.)	 [here	von	Neumann	writes	the	transition	from	a	single	initial	state	to	 a	 statistical	 mixture	 of	 final	 eigenstates,	 each	 with	 a	probability]….Second,	 the	 automatic	 changes	 that	 occur	with	 the	 passage	 of	 time.	 These	 are	 given	 by	 the	 formula	(2.)	[Here	von	Neumann	gives	the	Schrödinger	evolution].5		For	all	of	its	seeming	mathematical	rigor,	von	Neumann’s	scheme	is,	as	Bell	 would	 say,	 unprofessionally	 vague.	 Surely	 a	 measurement	 is	 just	some	 sort	 of	 physical	 interaction	 between	 systems	 just	 as	 otherwise	occurs	with	 the	 passage	 of	 time.	 After	 all,	what	physical	 characteristic	could	 distinguish	 measurements	 from	 other	 sorts	 of	 interactions,	 a	characteristic	 so	 precise	 that	 its	 presence	 or	 absence	 makes	 the	difference	 between	 smooth	 deterministic	 evolution	 and	 stochastic	jumpy	“collapses”.	This,	in	a	nutshell	is	the	measurement	problem.	The	Putnam	of	1965	was	rightfully	scandalized	by	the	state	of	the	foundations	 of	 quantum	 theory.	 	 He	 finds	 the	 Copenhagen	 approach	unsatisfactory	 as	 it	 seems	 to	 imply	 that	 particles	 only	 have	 positions	and	 momenta	 when	 they	 are	 measured	 and	 not	 in	 between	measurements.6	Furthermore,	 and	 rather	 ironically,	 this	 interpretation	is	 forced	 to	 say	 that	 the	 physical	 procedures	 we	 call	 “making	 a	measurement”	 are	 really	 no	 such	 thing:	 they	 do	 not	 reveal	 some	 pre-																																								 							5	John	von	Neumann,	Mathematical	Foundations	of	Quantum	Mechanics	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1955),	351.	6	Putnam,	Mathematics,	Matter	and	Method,	141.	
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existing	property	of	the	target	system	but	rather	serve	to	create	a	new	property.	Because	of	these	strange	features,	Putnam	discusses	so-called	“hidden	variables”	theories	in	which	there	is	more	to	the	physical	state	of	a	system	than	is	reflected	in	the	wavefunction.	The	de	Broglie/Bohm	‘pilot	 wave’	 theory	 was	 even	 then	 the	 most	 famous	 example,	 and	Putnam	discusses	it	in	detail.	He	says	that	he	doesn’t	like	it	because	it	is	mathematically	 contrived,	 and	 also	 raises	 a	 problem	 that,	 oddly,	requires	applying	classical	physics	to	a	quantum-mechanical	situation.		Putnam	also	discusses	Eugene	Wigner’s	attempt	to	tie	collapse	of	the	 wavefunction	 to	 human	 consciousness. 7 	He	 finds	 all	 such	approaches	 that	 take	 the	 collapse	 to	 be	 a	 physical	 event—rather	 than	just	 an	 updating	 of	 subjective	 probabilities	 on	 receipt	 of	 new	information—to	be	unacceptable,	concluding	that	
no	satisfactory	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	exists	today.	 The	questions	posed	by	 the	 confrontation	between	the	 Copenhagen	 interpretation	 and	 the	 hidden	 variable	theorists	 go	 to	 the	 very	 foundations	 of	 microphysics,	 but	the	answers	given	by	the	hidden	variable	theorists	and	the	Copenhagenists	are	alike	unsatisfactory.8	What	is	notable	about	these	two	examinations	of	quantum	theory	from	1965	is	that	the	question	of	logic	is	never	raised.	The	next	time	Putnam	weighs	in,	the	situation	is	quite	different.		The	Quantum	Logic	of	David	Finklestein																																									 							7	Putnam,	Mathematics,	Matter	and	Method,	147.	8	Putnam,	Mathematics,	Matter	and	Method,	157.	
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	 In	 1968	 Putnam	 returns	 to	 quantum	 theory	 with	 “The	 logic	 of	quantum	 mechanics”.9	As	 the	 title	 indicates,	 questioning—or	 at	 least	discussing—logic	 itself	 is	now	on	 the	main	menu.	Our	quick	 review	of	the	1965	works	have	set	the	table:	in	those,	Putnam	rejects	real	physical	collapses	of	 the	wavefunction,	 “hidden”	variables,	and	 the	Copenhagen	interpretation	because	none	of	them	could	deliver	what	he	regarded	as	a	 plausible	 account	 of	 measurement	 as	 a	 purely	 physical	 interaction	between	physical	systems.	The	question	that	we	must	keep	foremost	in	our	minds	is	how	the	introduction	of	a	new	logic,	or	even	more	radically	the	 replacement	 of	 classical	 logic	 with	 a	 new	 logic,	 could	 even	 in	principle	help	to	resolve	this	problem.	The	 main	 conceptual	 issue	 here	 concerns	 the	 question	 of	 what	
empirical	 import	 the	 logical	 connectives	 in	 a	 language	 can	 have.	 Let’s	take	 &	 as	 a	 clinical	 example.	 In	 propositional	 logic,	 &	 is	 a	 sentential	connective:	 two	 well-formed	 formulas	 connected	 by	 &	 constitute	another	well-formed	 formula.	 The	 “meaning”	 of	 the	 connective	 can	 be	given	 by	 a	 truth	 table	 or	 by	 a	 set	 of	 valid	 inferences.	 If	 every	 well-formed	formula	 is	either	true	or	 false,	 then	the	truth	table	 is	simple	to	specify:	A	&	B	is	true	if	both	A	and	B	are	true	and	is	false	otherwise.	In	terms	of	inferences,	we	give	&-Introduction	and	&-Elimination	rules.	&-Introduction	says	that	from	A	and	B	as	premises	one	can	derive	A	&	B	as	a	conclusion.	&-Elimination	says	that	from	A	&	B	one	can	derive	A	and	one	 can	 derive	 B.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	 see	 that	 the	 validity	 (truth-preservingness)	of	&-Introduction	requires	that	the	truth	of	both	A	and																																									 							9	Reprinted	as	Chapter	10	of	Mathematics,	Matter	and	Method,	174-197.	
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B	be	sufficient	for	the	truth	of	A	&	B,	and	&-Elimination	requires	that	it	be	necessary.	Now	 if	 one	 were	 to	 reject	 bivalence,	 and	 allow	 well-formed	formulas	to	be	other	than	True	or	False,	then	the	semantics	of	&	would	have	to	be	revisited.	If	this	new	scheme	retains	the	old	inference	rules,	then	again	the	truth	of	both	A	and	B	would	still	have	to	be	necessary	and	sufficient	 for	the	truth	of	A	&	B.	But	 if	 the	truth	values	expand	beyond	“true”	 and	 “false”	 then	 the	 conjunctions	 that	 include	 the	 new	 values	have	to	be	addressed.	But	what	possible	empirical	consequences	could	such	a	change	in	logic	have?	How	could	 anything	 like	 this	 solve	 the	physical	 issues	 that	must	 be	 confronted	 when	 trying	 to	 make	 clear	 sense	 of	 quantum	theory?	That	is	the	main	question	we	must	bear	in	mind	in	the	sequel.	The	Putnam	of	1965	 thought	 something	had	 to	be	done,	but	did	not	 know	what.	By	1968,	 the	 idea	 that	 logic	had	 to	be	 amended	 came	forward,	 but	 not	 because	 Putnam’s	 own	 investigations	 had	 led	 him	 in	that	 direction.	 Rather,	 as	 he	 makes	 clear,	 he	 was	 brought	 to	 the	approach	 by	 David	 Finkelstein.	 Finkelstein,	 in	 turn,	 was	 working	 in	 a	tradition	 that	 goes	 back	 to	 von	 Neumann	 and	 Garrett	 Birkhoff.10	The	mathematical	 core	 of	 this	 approach	 adverts	 to	 the	 structure	 of	subspaces	of	Hilbert	space.		Hilbert	 space	 is	 the	 space	 of	 all	 quantum-mechanical	wavefunctions.	 It	 is	 an	 infinite	 dimensional	 space,	 essentially	 just	because	wavefunctions	 are	 functions,	 and	 a	 function	 is	 specified	 at	 an																																									 							10	Garrett	Birkhoff	and	John	von	Neumann,	“The	Logic	of	Quantum	Mechanics”,	
Annals	of	Mathematics,	2nd	Ser.,	37,	no.	4	(Oct.	1936),	823-843.	
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infinitude	 of	 points.	 The	 other	 piece	 of	 mathematical	 machinery	 we	need	are	Hermitian	operators,	also	commonly	called	observables.	These	operators,	 as	 their	 name	 suggests,	 operate	 on	wavefunctions:	 hand	 an	operator	 a	wavefunction	 and	 it	 hands	 another	 back	 to	 you.	 In	 special	cases	 if	 you	 hand	 the	 operator	 a	wavefunction	 it	 hands	 back	 the	 very	same	 wavefunction	 multiplied	 by	 a	 number.	 Such	 a	 wavefunction	 is	called	 an	 eigenfunction	 of	 the	 operator	 and	 the	 number	 is	 called	 its	
eigenvalue.	At	this	point,	a	key	physical	assumption	is	made.	The	“observable”	operators	are	associated	with	physical	magnitudes	and	the	condition	for	a	system	to	have	a	definite	physical	magnitude	is	that	its	wavefunction	be	an	eigenfunction	of	the	associated	operator.	The	value	of	the	physical	magnitude	 is	 then	 its	 eigenvalue.	 Any	 wavfunction	 that	 is	 not	 an	eigenfunction	of	the	operator	fails	to	have	any	value	for	the	magnitude	at	
all.	 Thus,	 a	 wavefunction	 that	 is	 not	 an	 eigenfunction	 of	 the	 position	operator	represents	a	system	that	fails	to	have	any	definite	position,	and	a	waverfunction	that	is	not	an	eigenfunction	of	the	momentum	operator	represents	a	system	that	fails	to	have	any	definite	momentum.	And	since	no	 position	 eigenfunction	 is	 a	momentum	 eigenfunction,	mathematics	alone	 guarantees	 that	 no	 system	 can	 simultaneously	 have	 a	 definite	position	and	a	definite	momentum.	Indeed,	the	closer	a	system	comes	to	having	 a	 definite	 momentum,	 the	 further	 it	 is	 from	 having	 a	 definite	position	and	vice	versa.	This	is	an	instance	of	the	uncertainty	relation	or	
complementarity.	The	 final	 piece	 of	 the	 technical	 apparatus	 arises	 from	 the	observation	that	the	eigenfunctions	of	an	observable	that	have	the	same	
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eigenvalue	form	a	subspace	of	the	Hilbert	space,	called	its	eigenspace.	So	the	condition	for	a	system	to	have	a	particular	value	of	an	observable	is	that	 its	 wavefunction	 lies	 in	 that	 eigenspace.	 Therefore	 every	proposition	of	the	form	“System	S	has	value	V	for	observable	O”	can	be	associated	 with	 a	 particular	 subspace	 of	 Hilbert	 space.	 The	 truth	condition	 for	 the	 proposition	 is	 just	 the	 system	wavefunction	 lying	 in	the	 subspace.	 And	 the	 falsity	 condition	 is	 being	 perpendicular	 to	 the	subspace.	 If	 S’s	 wavefunction	 is	 neither	 in	 nor	 perpendicular	 to	 the	eigenspace	of	the	value	V	then	the	proposition	is	neither	true	nor	false,	and	a	measurement	of	the	observable	might	or	might	not	yield	the	value	V.	 Let’s	pause	 for	 a	moment	 to	 think	about	 this	 last	 case.	 	There	 is	some	observable	O	and	the	wavefunction	for	the	system	S	does	not	lie	in	any	eigenspace	of	O,	so	the	quantum	predictive	apparatus	makes	only	a	probabilistic	prediction	for	what	would	happen	were	you	to	measure	O.	What	options	are	there	for	assigning	a	truth	value	to	the	claim	that	S	has	a	particular	value	of	the	quantity	O?		One	thing	one	might	say	is	that	if,	in	fact,	S	has	the	value	V	then,	by	the	definition	of	what	a	“measurement”	 is,	a	measurement	would	have	to	 return	 the	 outcome	 “V”.	 And	 since	 there	 is	 no	 value	 that	 the	measurement	is	certain	to	return	if	it	should	happen	to	be	done,	there	is	no	value	that	S	has.	But	this	chain	of	reasoning	has	several	flaws.	One	is	that	what	we	usually	call	 “measurements”	 just	don’t	have	the	 feature	mentioned.	 If	 I	put	 a	 thermometer	 into	 a	 liquid	 to	 “measure”	 its	 temperature,	 the	reading	 is	 typically	 not	 the	 temperature	 that	 the	 liquid	 had	 before	 I	
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“measured”	 it.	 If	 the	 thermometer	was	 colder	 than	 the	 liquid	 then	 the	equilibrium	temperature	of	the	liquid-thermometer	system	at	the	end	is	lower	 than	 the	 original	 temperature	 of	 the	 liquid,	 and	 if	 the	thermometer	 was	 hotter	 then	 it	 is	 higher.	 Maybe	 one	 considers	 the	discrepancy	 unimportant,	 or	 maybe	 it	 is	 important	 enough	 to	 try	 to	compensate	 for.	 But	 to	 do	 that,	 one	 has	 to	 understand	 in	 complete	physical	detail	how	the	“measurement	device”	physically	interacts	with	the	 “system”	 to	 yield	 and	 outcome.	 And	 that,	 recall,	 just	 is	 the	measurement	problem!	So	on	this	approach	one	can’t	really	know	how	to	assign	truth	values	to	propositions	without	solving	the	measurement	problem.	 To	 appeal	 to	 a	 new	 logic	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 would	 be	 a	viciously	circular	procedure.	The	second	problem	is	that	the	fact	that	quantum	mechanics	only	generates	 probabilistic	 predictions	 about	 the	 outcomes	 of	measurements	 does	 not,	 by	 itself,	 imply	 anything	 about	 the	 systems	themselves.	 It	 might	 be	 that	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 system	 is	fundamentally	 indeterministic,	 and	 the	 system	 is	 neither	 disposed	 to	yield	 a	 particular	 value	 nor	 not	 to	 yield	 it.	 Or	 it	 could	 be	 that	 the	probabilities,	 and	 consequent	 statistical	 predictions,	 only	 reflect	 an	inadequacy	in	the	quantum	formalism,	and	that	the	wavefunction	used	to	make	 the	predictions	 is,	 in	Einstein’s	 terminology,	 incomplete.	That	is,	 the	 wavefunction	 fails	 to	 specify	 all	 of	 the	 physical	 features	 of	 a	system,	 and	 the	 statistical	 predictions	 arise	 because	 different	 systems	assigned	 the	 same	wavefunction	 are	physically	different.	Among	 these	differences	could	be	the	value	of	the	observable	quantity	O.	In	that	case,	the	 fact	 that	 quantum	mechanics	makes	 no	 definite	 prediction	 for	 the	
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outcome	of	an	O	measurement	would	not	imply	that	S	fails	to	have	any	value	 for	O.	To	understand	whether	 it	does	or	does	not	again	requires	solving	the	measurement	problem.	So	 there	 are	 two	 essential	 questions	 that	 the	 standard	presentation	 of	 quantum	 mechanics	 fails	 to	 answer:	 1)	 Is	 the	wavefunction	a	 complete	physical	description	of	a	 system	or	not?	And	2)	 How	 does	 the	 pre-interaction-with-a-“measuring”-device	 state	 of	 a	system	relate	to	its	post-interaction	state?	What	does	the	outcome	of	the	measurement	 indicate	 about	 the	 system	 before	 it	 was	 measured?	Without	 answers	 to	 these	 questions—physical	 answers—the	 truth	value	of	many	claims	cannot	even	be	addressed.	The	quantum	 logic	of	Finkenstein	purported	to	address	them.	The	 key	 to	 Finkelstein’s	 approach	 lies	 in	 the	 observation	 that	there	are	three	purely	mathematical	operations	on	subspaces	of	a	space	that	 bear	 some	 formal	 resemblance	 to	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 classical	truth-functional	 operators.	 Given	 two	 subspaces	 of	 a	 vector	 space	 one	can	 form	 their	 intersection,	which	 is	 just	 all	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 space	that	 lie	 in	 both	 of	 the	 subspaces.	 The	 intersection	 is	 itself	 a	 subspace.	And	given	two	subspaces	one	can	form	their	span,	which	is	just	the	set	of	 all	 vectors	 that	 can	 be	 formed	 by	 adding	 vectors	 from	 the	 two	subspaces.	The	span,	too,	is	a	subspace	of	the	vector	space.	Finally,	given	a	subspace	of	a	vector	space	one	can	form	its	orthocomplement,	which	is	just	 all	 of	 the	 vectors	 orthogonal	 to	 the	 subspace.	 It	 is	 yet	 another	subspace.	So	if	we	have	associated	every	subspace	of	a	vector	space	with	a	proposition,	 the	 intersection	 and	 span	 operations	 are	 operations	 on	 a	
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pair	 of	 propositions	 that	 yield	 a	 proposition,	 and	 the	orthocomplementation	 operation	 is	 an	 operation	 on	 a	 single	proposition	 that	 yields	 a	 proposition.	 How	 are	 these	 various	propositions	related	to	each	other	in	terms	of	their	truth	values?	Clearly,	if	proposition	A	is	true	because	the	state	of	S	lies	in	the	A-subspace,	and	proposition	B	is	true	because	the	state	of	S	lies	in	the	B-subspace,	 then	 the	 proposition	 associated	with	 the	 intersection	 of	 the	two	 subspaces,	 call	 it	 “A⊓B”,	 is	 true	 because	 the	 state	 of	 S	 lies	 in	 the	intersection	of	the	subspaces.	(This	notation	is	not	standard,	but	it	will	help	 keep	 things	 straight.)	And	 if	 either	A	 or	B	 is	 anything	 other	 than	true,	then	A⊓B	cannot	be	true,	because	if	a	state	does	not	lie	in	a	space	it	cannot	 lie	 in	 any	 subspace	 of	 that	 space.	 So	⊓	functions	 just	 like	 the	classical	&	with	respect	to	true	and	false	sentences.	Let’s	 indicate	 the	 proposition	 associated	 with	 the	orthocomplement	 of	 the	 A-subspace	 “⊥A”.	 Obviously,	 if	 A	 is	 true	 then	⊥A	is	not	true,	and	if	⊥A	is	true	then	A	is	not	true.	Again,	if	the	only	truth	values	 we	 had	 were	 true	 and	 false,	⊥ 	would	 operate	 just	 like	 the	classical	 negation.	 But	 here	 the	 divergence	 from	 classical	 negation	 is	more	severe.	Since	 there	are	vectors	 that	 lie	neither	 in	 the	A-subspace	nor	in	the	⊥A-subspace	(assuming	neither	is	the	whole	space),	there	are	propositions	such	that	neither	it	nor	its	orthocomplement	are	true.	So	⊥	does	not	work	 like	 classical	~	 in	 the	 sense	of	mapping	anything	other	than	a	true	proposition	to	a	true	proposition.		Finally,	 what	 about	 the	 span?	 We	 will	 indicate	 the	 proposition	associated	 with	 the	 span	 of	 the	 A-subspace	 and	 the	 B-subspace	 as	“A⊔B”.	One	the	one	hand,	if	the	state	of	a	system	lies	in	the	A-subspace	
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or	in	the	B-subspace	then	it	lies	in	the	span	of	the	two.	So	if	A	is	true	or	B	is	true	then	A⊔B	is	true.	But	there	are	many	vectors	that	lie	in	the	span	of	 the	 A-subspace	 and	 the	 B-subspace	 but	 don’t	 lie	 in	 in	 either.	 If	 the	state	of	a	system	is	one	of	these	vectors,	then	A⊔B	is	true	even	though	neither	 A	 nor	 B	 is	 true.	 So	 although	⊓	functions	 just	 like	 &,	⊔	is	 quite	unlike	the	classical	∨.	Interestingly,	 despite	 these	 differences,	 many	 tautologies	 of	classical	logic	remain	tautologies	(i.e.	propositions	true	for	every	state)	when	 the	 corresponding	 operators	 are	 substituted	 for	 each	 other.	Suppose,	 for	 example,	 we	 just	 define	 the	 falsehood	 of	 A	 in	 the	 new	system	as	the	truth	of	⊥A.	Then	there	are	some	propositions	in	the	new	language	 that	 are	 neither	 true	 nor	 false:	 we	 need	 a	 third	 truth	 value.	And,	mixing	the	different	sets	of	operators,	 for	any	such	proposition	A,	A	∨	⊥A	 is	 not	 true.	 But	 still,	 A	⊔	⊥A	 is	 true	 for	 all	 A	 since	 A	⊔	⊥A	 is	associated	with	the	entire	space.		Not	 all	 of	 the	 inferences	 that	 are	 valid	 in	 classical	 logic	 remain	valid	when	the	new	operators	are	substituted.	For	example,	in	classical	logic	A	&	(B	∨	C)	implies	(A	&	B)	∨	(A	&	C)	and	vice	versa.	But	in	the	new	system	 A	⊓	(B	⊔	C)	 can	 be	 true	 while	 (A	⊓	B)	⊔	(A	⊓	C)	 is	 false.	 The	analog	of	the	distributive	law	fails.	(To	see	an	example,	let	C	be	⊥B,	and	let	the	system	state	lie	in	the	A-subspace,	but	neither	in	the	B-subspace	nor	the	⊥B-subspace.	Then	A	⊓	(B	⊔	⊥B)	is	true,	but	(A	⊓	B)	⊔	(A	⊓	⊥B)	is	false.)	The	structure	of	subspaces	of	Hilbert	space	under	the	operations	of	 intersection,	 span,	 and	 orthocomplementation	 in	 this	way	 becomes	isomorphic	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 lattice	 of	 associated	 propositions	
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under	 the	 operations	 of	 meet,	 join,	 and	 orthocomplement.	 That,	 in	technical	terms,	is	what	Finkelstein’s	“quantum	logic”	is.	It	is	here	that	we	reach	a	critical	point	in	the	discussion.	There	are	two	 crucial	 questions.	 First,	 are	 there	 any	 grounds	 for	 thinking	 of	 the	operators	⊓	and	⊔	and	⊥	on	 these	 propositions	 as	 alternatives	 rather	than	supplements	to	the	classical	truth-functional	operators	&,	∨,	and	~?	And	second,	how	could	 the	 induction	of	 these	new	operators,	whether	as	 alternatives	 or	 as	 supplements,	 help	 us	 solve	 any	 interpretational	problem	of	quantum	theory?		Finkelstein’s	Logic	and	Understanding	Quantum	Theory		 The	 most	 immediate	 question	 to	 ask	 when	 presented	 with	something	 called	 “quantum	 logic”	 is	 whether	 it	 is	 being	 offered	 as	 a	
supplement	to	or	a	replacement	for	classical	logic.	If	we	don’t	know	this,	then	we	have	no	idea	how	to	proceed.	If	the	new	logic	merely	supplements	the	old,	then	adding	the	new	logical	 connectives	 creates	 a	 more	 effective	 and	 extensive	 logical	language,	 but	 does	 not	 revise	 any	 results	 of	 the	 old	 logic.	 All	 the	 old	tautologies	are	still	tautological,	all	the	old	valid	inferences	still	valid.	In	this	spirit,	we	could	add	⊓	and	⊔	and	⊥	to	a	formal	language	alongside	&	and	∨	and	~.		If	the	vector	representing	a	system	falls	in	the	span	of	the	subspaces	A	and	B,	but	not	in	the	A-subspace	and	not	in	the	B	subspace,	then	we	could	truly	write:	(A	⊔	B)	&	~(A∨B).	 	 In	such	a	way,	we	could	convey	more	using	the	new	language	than	we	could	have	in	the	old.	
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Such	a	change	might	be	a	useful	innovation	in	 logic,	but	certainly	not	 a	 conceptual	 revolution.	 There	 would	 have	 been	 nothing	 strictly	
wrong	 in	the	old	 language,	which	remains	as	a	 fragment	nestled	inside	the	 new.	 At	 worst,	 we	 might	 have	 been	 tempted	 to	 incorrectly	 use	∨ instead	of	the	more	appropriate	⊔,	or	~	rather	than	⊥.		Putnam’s	 thought	 about	 quantum	 logic,	 though,	 is	 much	 more	radical.	The	 radical	 idea	 is	 that	 the	new	 logic	 is	 to	replace	 the	old	one	rather	than	supplement	it,	and	the	formal	similarity	between	⊔	and	∨,	⊓	and	 &,	 and	⊥	and	 &	 makes	 clear	 how	 the	 substitution	 goes.	 In	 some	sense	disjunction	really	is	⊔	rather	than	∨,	and	so	on.	The	key	analogy	here	is	supposed	to	be	that	of	Euclidean	and	non-Euclidean	geometry.	For	millennia,	humans	believed	that	they	lived	in	a	three-dimensional	 Euclidean	 space.	 Furthermore,	 they	 believed	 that	they	 had	 some	 sort	 of	 a	 priori	 access	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 that	 space,	codified	 in	 the	 theorems	 of	 Euclidean	 geometry.	 But	 eventually,	empirical	 and	 explanatory	 pressures	 made	 it	 rational	 to	 supplant	 the	Euclidean	 hypothesis	with	 a	 non-Euclidean	 one.	 This	was	 obviously	 a	replacement	rather	than	an	enhancement:	the	old	system	is	abandoned	in	favor	of	the	new.	One	understands	why	the	old	worked	as	well	as	 it	did,	but	in	the	end	it	simply	is	regarded	as	a	false	approximation	to	the	truth.	The	 analogy	 between	 geometry	 and	 logic	 is	 made	 explicitly	 in	“How	 to	 think	 quantum-logically”	 	 (1974),11	and	 is	 very	 telling.	 In	 the	case	 of	 geometry,	 we	 definitely	 have	 a	 replacement	 rather	 than	 an	expansion.	The	Euclidean	geometry	must	die	so	that	the	non-Euclidean																																									 							11	Hilary	Putnam,	“How	to	Think	Quantum-Logically”,	Synthese	29	(1974),	55-61.	
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can	 live.	 And	 in	 the	 process,	 some	 empirical	 phenomena—such	 as	 the	anomalous	advance	of	 the	perihelion	of	Mercury—get	explained.12	Our	main	questions,	 then,	 are	what	 could	 it	 even	mean	 to	 replace	 classical	logic	with	some	other	logic?	And	if	we	can	get	clear	on	that,	how	could	any	such	replacement	help	solve	any	empirical	problems?	It	is	useful	to	have	an	example	here.	What	empirical	problems	did	the	switch	from	Special	Relativity	(flat	space-time	geometry)	to	General	Relativity	 (curved	 space-time	 geometry)	 help	 account	 for?	 The	anomalous	 advance	 of	 the	 perihelion	 of	Mercury,	 the	 bending	 of	 light	passing	near	the	Sun,	the	gravitational	Red	shift…these	are	the	standard	answers.	 None	 of	 these	 phenomena	 are	 logically	 incompatible	 with	Special	 Relativity.	 Adjustments	 to	 overall	 physics	 elsewhere,	 that	 kept	the	 flat	 space-time,	 are	 possible.	 But	 General	 Relativity	 accounts	 for	them	in	a	simple	and	satisfying	way.	So	 what	 is	 the	 parallel	 example	 of	 a	 switch	 to	 quantum	 logic	making	 the	 explanation	 of	 a	 physical	 phenomenon	 simpler	 and	 more	elegant?	Interestingly,	 there	 isn’t	one.	 Instead,	Putnam	 tries	 to	argue	 that	
classical	 logic	 yields	 bad	predictions,	 but	 not	 at	 all	 that	quantum	 logic	corrects	these	predictions.	And	the	example	he	discusses	is	the	famous	two-slit	interference	effect.	Let’s	quickly	recap	that.	If	 we	 fire	 elections	 or	 photons	 at	 a	 barrier	 with	 a	 thin	 slit,	 an	image	appears	behind	 the	barrier	 that	 is	 roughly	 the	 shape	of	 the	 slit,	but	spread	out	in	the	direction	that	the	slit	is	thin.	It	is	brightest	in	the																																									 							12	Properly	speaking,	General	Relativity	does	not	so	much	demand	replacing	Euclidean	with	non-Euclidian	geometry,	as	replacing	flat	Minkowski	space-time	with	a	variably	curved	space-time.	But	the	analogy	is	very	tight.	
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middle	 and	 shades	 off	 to	 either	 side.	 Let’s	 call	 this	 the	 image	 formed	when	only	Slit	A	 is	open.	 If	we	close	Slit	A	and	make	a	nearby	parallel	Slit	B,	the	image	just	moves	to	behind	Slit	B.	No	surprise.	But	what	if	both	slits	are	opened?	Then	instead	of	just	getting	the	sum	 of	 the	 two	 images,	 one	 gets	 a	 highly	 striped	 set	 of	 interference	bands,	 rapidly	 alternating	 between	 bright	 and	 dark.	 The	 pattern	 is	reminiscent	 of	 the	 interference	 patterns	 in	 water	 waves	 in	 similar	circumstances.	 But	 curiously,	 the	 pattern	 persists	 even	 when	 the	electrons	are	sent	one	at	a	time,	and	the	images	form	one	discrete	spot	at	a	time.	Now	this	behavior	may	be	surprising,	but	Putnam	makes	a	much,	much	stronger	claim:	it	is	not	the	behavior	that	classical	logic	leads	us	to	expect!	How	does	that	argument	go?	Putnam	makes	 the	 following	“classical”	argument.	 If	you	want	 to	know	how	likely	it	is	for	an	electron	to	land	in	a	particular	region	R	on	the	screen	(call	the	proposition	that	 it	 lands	there	 ‘R’),	 first	close	slit	B	and	measure	the	number	with	only	A	open.	Call	the	proposition	that	the	particle	passes	through	slit	A	‘A’.	So	we	get	a	number:	prob(R/A).	Do	the	same	by	closing	slit	A	and	opening	B	to	record	prob(R/B),	the	chance	of	hitting	R	is	the	particle	goes	through	B.	Now	what	about	with	both	slits	open?	In	that	case,	says	Putnam,	the	particle	must	either	go	through	Slit	A	or	through	Slit	B,	so	for	every	electron	that	makes	it	to	the	screen	we	have	the	truth	of	A	∨	B.	What	we	want	 is	Prob(R/A	∨	B).	Now	by	some	fancy	manipulations,	Putnam	“derives”	that	classical	logic	requires	that	Prob(R/A	∨	B)	=	½	Prob(R/A)	+	½	Prob	(R/B).	The	appearance	of	the	½	comes	as	a	bit	of	a	shock:	offhand,	one	would	suppose	that	the	chance	of	
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getting	to	R	by	going	either	through	A	or	B	is	just	the	sum	of	the	chance	going	 through	A	with	 the	 chance	 going	 through	B.	 But	 let’s	 leave	 that	curiosity	 aside.	 	 What	 a	 moment’s	 thought	 reveals	 is	 that,	 whatever	Putnam	 has	 calculated,	 it	 can’t	 possibly	 be	 a	 consequence	 of	 “classical	logic”	or	any	other	kind	of	logic!	Consider	the	situation.	We	do	one	experiment	with	one	slit	open.	We	 record	 a	 number.	 We	 do	 another	 experiment	 with	 the	 other	 slit	open.	We	 record	 another	 number.	 Now	we	wonder	what	will	 happen	with	both	slits	open.	Well,	as	far	as	logic	of	any	kind	goes,	anything	could	happen!	 The	 apparatus	 could	 blow	 up.	 All	 of	 the	 electrons	 could	 be	reflected	 back	 to	 the	 source.	 The	 electrons	 could	 all	 turn	 into	 rabbits.	
Logic	won’t	prevent	it!	The	 fallacy,	 once	 you	 point	 it	 out,	 is	 glaringly	 obvious.	 The	 first	experiment	shows	how	many	electrons	get	through	slit	A	and	land	in	R	
when	only	slit	A	is	open.	And	the	second	how	many	get	through	slit	B	and	land	 in	R	when	only	slit	B	is	open.	 From	 the	point	of	 view	of	 logic,	 this	tells	us	exactly	nothing	about	what	will	happen	when	both	slits	are	open.	Formally,	let’s	let	O(A)	stand	for	only	A	is	open,	O(B)	stand	for	only	B	is	open,	 and	O(A,B)	 stand	 for	 both	A	 and	B,	 and	 only	A	 and	B	 are	 open.	Then	the	first	experiment	measures	prob(R/A	&	O(A)),	and	the	second	measures	 prob(R/B	 &	 O(B)).	 And	 what	 the	 two-slit	 experiment	measures,	 assuming	 the	electron	goes	 through	one	 slit	 or	 the	other,	 is	prob(R/(A	∨	B)	 &	 O(A,B)).	 But	 since	 the	 first	 experiments	 carry	 no	information	at	all	 about	 the	condition	O(A,B),	no	 logic	 in	 the	world,	of	any	 kind,	 will	 allow	 you	 to	 derive	 the	 third	 probability	 from	 the	 first	two.	
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Further,	all	Putnam	attempts	to	show	is	that	classical	logic	yields	a	bad	 prediction,	 not	 that	 quantum	 logic	 yields	 a	 good	 one.	 When	 we	replace	 the	 space-time	 of	 Special	 Relativity	 with	 that	 of	 General	Relativity,	we	not	only	abandon	the	Special	Relativistic	predictions,	we	acquire	the	new	General	Relativistic	ones.	If	Putnam	had	tried	to	make	a	parallel	argument,	it	would	have	become	obvious	that	the	first,	classical,	argument	was	invalid.	How	could	Putnam	have	been	 led	so	 far	astray?	 In	 “The	Logic	of	Quantum	 Mechanics”	 he	 repeatedly	 emphasizes	 that	 the	 account	 of	quantum	 logic	 is	 not	 his	 own:	 it	 is	 Finklestein’s.	 His	 account	 lies	somewhere	 between	 reporting	 and	 endorsing.	He	 is	 perhaps	 trying	 to	set	the	large-scale	stage	for	the	very	idea	of	logic	being	empirical	rather	than	pushing	a	particular	account	of	the	right	logic.	Of	course,	since	the	example	fails	so	spectacularly,	we	are	left	with	no	clue	about	how	logic	really	could	be	empirical.	But	Putnam	was	not	done	with	the	topic	yet.		Gestures	Towards	Yet	Another	Quantum	Logic		 In	1974	Putnam	returns	to	the	question	of	quantum	logic	with	the	very	short	paper	entitled	“How	to	Think	Quantum-Logically”.	As	already	mentioned,	 this	 paper	 starts	 with	 the	 proportionality	 [Euclidean]	Geometry:	 General	 Relativity::	 [Classical]	 Logic:	 Quantum	Mechanics.	 I	have	 supplied	 the	 bracketed	 clarifications,	which	 are	 clearly	 intended.	Once	 again	 the	 overarching	 theme	 is	 that	 just	 as	 General	 Relativity	demands	 the	 rejection	 of	 Euclidean	 geometry	 as	 the	 price	 for	 a	tremendous	 simplification	of	physics,	 so	Quantum	Mechanics	offers	us	
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an	 elegant	 account	 of	 physical	 phenomena	 at	 the	 price	 of	 replacing	classical	logic.	The	paper	is	written	in	a	slightly	coy	way.	Putnam	begins	by	expositing	what	“the	advocate	of	the	quantum,-logical	interpretation	of	 quantum	 mechanics	 claims”, 13 	as	 if	 this	 were	 a	 dispassionate		presentation	of		one	approach	to	understanding	quantum	theory.	But	he	soon	 enough	 slips	 into	 the	 revelatory	 locution	 “we	 advocates	 of	 this	interpretation”14	indicating	that	a	defense	of	quantum	logic	rather	than	merely	an	exposition	is	in	store.	We	 have	 already	 seen	 that	 Putnam’s	 attempt	 to	 tie	 the	 two-slit	experiment	 to	 some	 logical	 principle	 failed.	 In	 this	 paper,	 no	 such	empirical	 phenomenon	 as	 the	 two-slit	 experiment	 is	 even	mentioned.	And	 in	 a	 further	 surprise,	 there	 is	 no	 trace	 of	 Finklestein’s	 quantum	logic.	Putnam	is	now	setting	out	to	create	his	own	new	logic,	based	on	new	arguments.	Fineklestein’s	 logic,	 founded	 on	 the	 structure	 of	 subspaces	 of	Hilbert	 space	 under	 the	 operations	 of	 intersection	 and	 span,	made	 no	change	 to	 the	 conjunction-like	 operation.	 The	 classical	 conjunction	 of	two	propositions	is	true	iff	the	system’s	state	lies	in	the	intersection	of	the	two	propositions’	subspaces.	The	novelty	 in	Finkelstein’s	 logic	was	all	in	the	analogs	of	disjunction	and	negation.	But	Putnam’s	new	logic	is	just	 the	opposite.	The	novelty	 lies	 in	the	analog	of	conjunction!	How	is	that	supposed	to	work?	There	 are	 really	 two	 tricks	 that	 Putnam	 pulls	 here,	 one	 with	disjunction	 and	 the	 other	 with	 conjunction.	 These	 tricks	 are	 both	 in																																									 							13	Putnam,	“How	to	Think”,	55.	14	Putnam,	“How	to	Think”,	55.	
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service	 of	 one	 main	 contention:	 that	 the	 interactions	 called	“measurements”	 really	 deserve	 the	 name.	 That	 is,	 a	 “measurement”	merely	reveals	a	pre-existing	fact	about	a	system,	rather	than	playing	a	role	 in	 creating	 some	 new	 fact.	 The	 very	 first	 characteristic	 of	 what	Putnam	calls	the	“quantum	logical	view	of	the	world”	is:	(1)	Measurement	 only	 determines	what	 is	 already	 the	
case:	 it	 does	 not	 bring	 into	 existence	 the	 observable	
measured,	or	cause	it	to	‘take	on	a	sharp	value’	that	it	did	not	
already	possess.15																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																												There	 are	 two	ways	 to	 understand	 this	 fundamental	 principle.	 One	 is	merely	 as	 a	 stipulation,	 as	 a	 definition	 of	 what	 it	 takes	 to	 count	 as	 a	“measurement”	in	the	sense	Putnam	wishes	to	use	that	term.	As	such,	it	would	 have	 nothing	 to	 do	with	 logic	 at	 all,	 because	 “measurement”	 is	not	 a	 logical	 particle.	 	 And	 if	 this	 is	 just	 a	 stipulation,	 it	 is	 an	 open	question	 whether,	 according	 to	 some	 theory,	 there	 are	 any	“measurements”.	 Since	 typical	 measurements	 are	 interactions,	 it	 is	 a	question	of	theoretical	analysis	whether	the	“outcome”	of	the	supposed	“measurement”	accurately	indicates	some	pre-existing	state	of	affairs.		Putnam	 evidently	 wants	 to	 take	 the	 term	 “measurement”	 a	different	 way.	 He	 wants	 to	 regard	 certain	 experimental	 conditions	 as	constituting	 paradigm	 “measurements”,	 especially	 “measurements”	 of	position	 and	 momentum.	 Having	 fixed	 that,	 principle	 (1)	 becomes	 a	
constraint	on	the	physical	analysis	of	these	paradigmatic	“measurements”.	
																																								 							15	Putnam,	“How	to	Think”,	57.	
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The	Putnam-style	quantum	logician	is	simply	not	open	to	a	physics	that	analyzes	these	paradigm	situations	so	that	the	outcome	of	the	physical	interaction	 between	 the	 system	 and	 the	 apparatus	 does	 not	 reveal	 a	pre-existing	 physical	magnitude.	 It	 is	 an	 odd	 thing	 to	 adopt	 such	 an	a	
priori	 demand	on	 these	particular	 experimental	 arrangements.	 	 Surely	
logic	cannot	demand	it!	And	even	more	than	that,	proofs	due	to	Kochen	and	Specker,16	Bell17,	and	Greenberger,	Horne	and	Zeilinger18	show	that	
no	 physics	 can	 possibly	 meet	 the	 requirements	 of	 principle	 (1).	 The	principle	defies	not	classical	 logic	but	mathematics	 itself	 if	we	want	 to	recover	the	quantum-mechanical	predictions.	It	is	simply	off	the	table.	If	one	demands	that	an	acceptable	physics	meet	a	condition	that	is	mathematically	 impossible	 to	meet	 there	 is	 bound	 to	 be	 trouble.	 And	basically	Putnam’s	new	logic	tries	to	defuse	that	trouble	by	abandoning	classical	logic.	Let’s	trace	the	steps.	First,	 Putnam	 takes	 a	 page	 out	 of	 Finkelstein.	 There	 are	eigenstates	of	the	position	operator,	and	according	to	the	interpretation	Putnam	 is	using	 the	only	 situation	 in	which	a	particle	has	a	particular	position	is	when	it	is	in	a	eigenstate	with	that	eigenvalue.	And	there	are	many,	 many	 states	 that	 are	 not	 eigenstates	 of	 the	 position	 operator.																																									 							16	S.	Kochen	and	E.	Specker,	“The	Problem	of	Hidden	Variables	in	Quantum	Mechanics”,	Journal	of	Mathematics	and	Mechanics,	17	(1967),	59–87. 	17	J.	S.	Bell,	“On	the	Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen	paradox”,	Physics	1	(1964),	195-200.	
18	D.	M.	Greenberger,	M.	A.	Horne	and	A.	Zeilinger,	“Going	beyond	Bell's	Theorem,”	in	Bell’s	Theorem,	Quantum	Theory	and	Conceptions	of	the	Universe,	M.	Kafatos	(ed.),	Dordrecht-Boston-London:	Kluwer	(1989),	69–72.		
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Indeed,	 all	 but	 a	 set	 of	measure	 zero	 are	 not	 position	 eigenstates	 but	rather	superpositions	of	position	eigenstates.	So	if	we	are	using	classical	logic	it	is	correct	to	say	than	in	most	states	the	particle	has	no	particular	position.	But	 the	 span	 of	 all	 the	 position	 eigenstates	 is	 the	whole	 Hilbert	space,	which	includes	every	possible	wavefunction.	Similarly,	the	set	of	momentum	eigenstates	is	a	set	of	measure	zero	in	the	Hilbert	space,	but	the	span	of	that	set	is	the	whole	Hilbert	space.	Putnam	now	considers	a	single	particle,	which,	he	says,	has	a	position	and	has	a	momentum:		In	 symbols,	 taking	 ‘Oscar’	 to	 be	 the	 name	 of	 one	 of	 these	particles:	(Er)	 the	 position	 of	 Oscar	 is	 r.	 (Er’)	 the	momentum	of	Oscar	is	r’.	 	 	 	 	 		But	 it	must	not	be	 concluded	 that	 each	of	 these	particles	has	 a	 position	 and	 a	 momentum!	 For	 the	 following	 is	
rejected:	(Er)(Er’)(the	 position	 of	 Oscar	 is	 r.	 the	momentum	of	Oscar	is	r’).19		Since	 these	 two	 sentences	 are	 logically	 equivalent	 in	 classical	 logic,	quantum	logic	must	depart	from	classical	logic.	But	how?	Finklestein’s	 logic	 has	 the	 logical	 inequivalence	 of	 the	 two	sentences	because	a	“disjunction”	(i.e.	span)	of	two	propositions	can	be	true	without	 any	 of	 the	 “disjuncts”	 being	 true.	 The	 existential	 claim	 is	
																																								 							19	Putnam,	“How	to	Think”,	57.	
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just	 an	 infinitary	 disjunction,	 so	 for	 Finklestein	 it	 can	 be	 true	without	any	 instance	 being	 true.	 So	 each	 conjunct	 in	 the	 first	 conjunction	 is	true—even	 necessarily	 true—making	 the	 conjunction	 necessarily	 true	as	 well.	 But	 the	 second	 sentence,	 instead	 of	 being	 a	 conjunction	 of	(infinite)	 disjunctions,	 is	 an	 (infinite)	 disjunction	 of	 conjunctions.	 In	Finklestein’s	 logic,	 each	 of	 the	 conjunctions	 is	 false,	 since	 the	intersection	of	a	position	eigenstate	and	a	momentum	eigenstate	is	zero.	Since	every	conjunction	is	false,	so	is	their	infinite	disjunction.	It	is	true	on	 Finklestein’s	 logic	 that	 every	 particle	 has	 a	 position	 and	 every	particle	 has	 a	 momentum,	 but	 no	 particle	 has	 both	 a	 position	 and	 a	momentum.	At	least	if	we	translate	the	span	into	English	as	if	it	were	a	disjunction.	Putnam’s	quantum	 logic	 cannot	 achieve	 the	 inequivalence	of	 the	two	 sentences	 in	 the	 same	 way	 that	 Finklestein’s	 does.	 Putnam’s	requirement	 that	 “measurements”	 merely	 reveal	 pre-existing	 physical	facts	demands	that	such	physical	facts	always	exist.	Individual	particles	do	not	merely		have	position-in-general	without	any	specific	position,	as	Finklestein	would	have	it,	but	they	always	have	some	particular	position	just	 as	 the	 classical	 disjunction	 would	 demand.	 And	 similarly	 for	Putnam’s	 particle’s	momentum:	 unlike	 Finklestein’s,	 it	 has	 not	merely	momentum-in-general	 but	 always	 a	 particular	 (albeit	 unknown)	momentum.	 For	 Putnam,	 unlike	 for	 Finklestein,	 the	 existential	sentences	are	true	because	some	specific	instance	is	true.	The	semantics	of	 disjunction	 is	 just	 classical	 semantics.	 And	 the	 conjunction	 of	 the	existentials	is	true	because	each	conjunct	is	true.	
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The	pressing	question,	then,	is	how	Putnam	intends	to	achieve	the	semantic	difference	between	the	conjunction	of	the	existentials	and	the	double	existential	over	the	conjunction.	If	Oscar	really	has	some	specific	position	and	some	specific	momentum,	how	can	Oscar	fail	to	have	both	a	specific	position	and	momentum?	Putnam	bites	the	only	bullet	he	has	left:	the	problem	with	classical	logic	 is	 not	 disjunction,	 but	 conjunction!	 In	 classical	 logic,	 the	 truth	 of	the	 conjuncts	 separately	 implies	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 conjunction.	 But	 for	Putnam,	each	of	the	conjuncts	can	be	true	without	the	conjunction	being	true.	This	is	not	a	possibility	that	Finklestein	ever	suggested.	But	how	can	that	be?	How	can	A	be	true	and	B	be	true	but	A	&	B	fail	 to	 be	 true?	 What	 does	 that	 even	 mean?	 Are	 there	 any	 vaguely	analogous	 examples	 of	 the	 failure	 of	 conjunction	 in	 an	 everyday	context?	Unfortunately,	 Putnam	 never	 directly	 confronts	 this	 issue.	 He	simply	says	that	the	conjunction	of	a	particular	position	and	a	particular	momentum	 cannot	 be	 true,	 since	 otherwise	 we	 would	 not	 have	 the	principle	of	complementarity!	Here	is	the	relevant	passage:	Complementarity	is	fully	retained.	For	any	particular	r	and	any	particular	r’	the	statement	‘Oscar	has	position	r	and	Oscar	has	momentum	r’	 ‘	 is	 a	 logical	 contradiction.	 It	 is,	of	course,	 just	 the	 sacrifice	 of	 the	 distributive	 law	 that	 we	mentioned	 a	 few	 moments	 ago	 that	 enables	 us	 to	simultaneously	 retain	 the	 objective	 conception	 of	measurement	 as	 finding	 out	 something	 which	 exists	independently	 and	 the	 objective	 conception	 of	
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complementarity	 as	 a	 prohibition	 on	 the	 simultaneous	existence	of	certain	states	of	affairs,	not	just	as	a	prohibition	on	simultaneous	knowledge.20		But	 the	 distributive	 law	 has	 really	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 the	 case.	 If	position	 measurements	 always	 reveal	 pre-existent	 positions	 and	momentum	 measurements	 always	 reveal	 pre-existent	 momenta,	 then	the	 particles	 always	 have	 pre-existent	 positions	 and	 pre-existent	momenta.	One	need	not	appeal	to	any	distributive	law	to	conclude	that	Oscar	always	has	both.	What	Putnam	has	in	mind	is	only	revealed	on	the	last	page	of	the	article.	There	he	asserts—contrary	to	both	Finklestein	and	to	quantum	theory—that	a	system	does	not	have	one	wavefunction	(“state	vector”)	but	many.	Since	no	single	wavefunction	can		ascribe	both	a	position	and	a	momentum	to	Oscar,	and	Putnam	want	to	maintain	that	Oscar	always	has	both	a	position	and	a	momentum,	he	is	forced	into	this	position.	But	somehow,	 although	 Oscar	 is	 described	 by	 both	 of	 these	 state	 vectors	simultaneously,	 one	 is	 not	 allowed	 to	 say	 so!	 For	 that,	 according	 to	Putnam,	would	be	a	quantum-logical	contradiction.	If	this	situation	sounds	incoherent,	that’s	because	it	is.	Here	is	part	of	the	next	to	last	paragraph	of	the	paper:	Thus	we	get:	a	system	has	more	than	one	state	vector,	on	 the	 quantum-logic	 interpretation,	 but	 one	 can	 never	
assign	more	than	one	state	vector!	Or,	to	drop	talk	of	 ‘state	vectors’	 altogether…we	 may	 say:	 A	 system	 has	 a	 position	
and	it	has	a	momentum.	But	if	you	know	the	position	(say	r),																																									 							20	Putnam,	“How	to	Think”,	58.	
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you	cannot	know	 the	momentum.	For	 if	you	did,	say,	know	that	the	momentum	was	r’,	you	would	know	‘Oscar	has	the	position	 r.	 Oscar	 has	 the	momentum	 r’',	 which	 is	 a	 logical	contradiction.21	It	is	really	impossible	to	make	sense	of	this	paragraph.	First,	 the	mention	 of	knowledge	 comes	 out	 of	 nowhere:	 up	 until	now,	 no	 epistemic	 issues	 have	 even	 been	 raised.	 But	 further,	 if	 all	propositions	 of	 the	 form	 ‘Oscar	 has	 the	 position	 r.	 Oscar	 has	 the	momentum	 r’'	 are	 logical	 contradictions,	 then	 if	 I	 know	 Oscar	 has	position	r,	 it	 is	not	just	that	I	can’t	know	Oscar’s	momentum,	but	Oscar	can’t	have	 a	momentum.	Whether	 I	 know	 it	 or	not	 is	neither	here	nor	there.	So	Putnam’s	desire	for	Oscar	to	have	both	a	definite	position	and	a	definite	momentum	collapses.	Clearly,	 Putnam’s	 new	 original	 quantum	 logic	 was	 a	 work	 in	progress	at	 this	point.	 In	his	 last	paper	on	this	 topic,	he	tries	 to	clarify	the	situation.		Quantum	Logic	as	the	Logic	of	Prediction		 Putnam’s	 attack	 on	 the	 “logic”	 of	 conjunction	 finally	 gets	 a	coherent	 explication	 in	 the	 1981	 paper	 “Quantum	Mechanics	 and	 the	Observer”.22 	Once	 again,	 all	 of	 our	 foundational	 questions	 arise.	 Is	“quantum	 conjunction”	 supposed	 to	 replace	 classical	 conjunction	 or																																									 							21	Putnam,	“How	to	Think”,	61.		22	Hilary	Putnam,	“Quantum	Mechanics	and	the	Observer”,	Erkenntnis	16,	no.	2	(July	1981),	193-219.	
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supplement	 it?	And	what	 could	possibly	go	empirically	wrong	with	 the	classical	 truth-functional	 operator?	 If	 one	 just	 stipulates	 that	 A	&	B	 is	true	iff	A	is	true	and	B	is	true,	how	could	such	a	stipulation	lead	to	any	new	 empirical	 consequences	 at	 all?	 There	 certainly	 seems	 to	 be	 no	bearing	 of	 conjunction	 on	 the	 two-slit	 experiment,	 where	 at	 least	 the	issue	of	disjunction	(“the	particle	goes	through	slit	A	or	the	particle	goes	through	 slit	 B”)	 appears	 to	 be	 relevant	 to	 any	 proposed	 explanation.	What	issue	is	there	with	conjunction?	We	 last	 left	 Putnam	 in	 a	 bind.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 he	 wants	 the	experiments	 we	 call	 “measurements”	 to	 just	 reveal	 some	 pre-existing	physical	property	of	a	system	rather	than	play	a	causal	role	in	creating	the	 property.	 And	 since	 position	 measurements	 and	 momentum	measurements	 always	 have	 outcomes,	 it	 follows	 that	 particles	 always	have	 both	 positions	 and	 momenta.	 But	 according	 to	 the	 Finklestein	quantum	 logic,	 the	 conjunction	 of	 a	 proposition	 assigning	 a	 particle	 a	position	 and	 a	 proposition	 assigning	 the	 particle	 a	 momentum	 is	
logically	 false.	 No	 state	 vector	 assigned	 to	 the	 system	 can	 make	 both	true.	What	to	do?	In	“Quantum	mechanics	and	the	observer”,	Putnam	doubles	down	on	 the	 assertion	 that	 particles	 always	 have	 both	 position	 and	momentum.	 This	 is	 true	 even	 though	 position	 (at	 a	 time)	 and	momentum	 (at	 that	 time)	 are	 quantum-mechanically	 incompatible	observables.	 Even	 more	 than	 that,	 he	 asserts	 that	 sometimes	 we	 can	
know	both	of	these	two	incompatible	observables	to	arbitrary	accuracy,	so	 long	as	the	knowledge	is	about	some	time	in	the	past.	 	Suppose,	 for	example,	there	is	a	source	with	a	shutter	in	it	surrounded	by	a	spherical	
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screen.	 If	 the	 shutter	 is	 opened	 briefly	 at	 t0,	 resulting	 in	 a	 spherical	wavefunction	 propagating	 outwards,	 and	 a	 flash	 is	 observed	 in	 some	small	region	R	of	the	screen	at	t1,	then	the	experiment	tells	us	both	that	a	particle	escaped	at	t0	and	that	it	was	in	R	at	t1.	But,	as	Putnam	points	out,	the	quantum	mechanical	states	associated	with	these	properties	are	incompatible:	one	cannot	prepare	any	state	that	is	certain	to	both	pass	through	 the	 open	 shutter	 and	 arrive	 the	 appropriate	 time	 later	 at	 R.	Each	of	these	properties	has	an	associated	quantum	state,	|𝜓0>	and	|𝜓1>,	but	these	states	are	incompatible.	Their	quantum-logical	conjunction	is	necessarily	false.	Nonetheless,	says	Putnam,	we	can	know	that	both	are	true	of	the	system!	His	conclusion	is	twofold.	First,	that	a	system	may	be	described	by	not	 just	 one	quantum	state	but	 two	 (or	more).	 In	 some	 sense,	 each	of	these	quantum	states	provides	a	true	description	of	the	system.	Second,	that	 these	 two	 quantum	 states	 need	 not	 be	 quantum-logically	compatible.	Both	 of	 these	 claims	 are	 anathema	 to	 standard	 accounts	 of	quantum	 theory.	 But	 quite	 apart	 from	 that,	 the	 results	 appear	 to	 run	contrary	to	the	whole	quantum-logical	approach.	If	|𝜓0>	truly	describes	S,	 and	 |𝜓1>	 is	 logically	 incompatible	 with	 |𝜓0>,	 then	 one	would	 think	that	|𝜓1>	cannot	truly	describe	S.	But	in	an	unpredictable	twist,	Putnam	tries	to	bring	quantum	logic	to	the	rescue	here.	Since	|𝜓o>	and	|𝜓1>	are	incompatible,	 their	 quantum	 logical	 conjunction	 is	 logically	 false.	Nonetheless,	each	of	the	conjuncts	is	true!	The	solution,	Putnam	opines,	is	 that	 each	 of	 a	 pair	 of	 propositions	may	 be	 true	 but	 their	 conjunction	
false.	That	is	what	quantum	logic,	together	with	Putnam’s	decision	to	let	
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more	 than	 one	wavefunction	 describe	 a	 system,	 inexorably	 entail.	 But	how	to	make	sense	of	a	false	conjunction	with	two	true	conjuncts?	After	all,	it	still	seems	perfectly	acceptable	to	have	a	connective—call	it	#—defined	so	that	A#B	is	true	just	in	case	each	of	A	and	B	are	true.	From	the	truth	of	each	of	the	pair	one	can	validly	infer	the	truth	of	A#B,	and	 from	 the	 truth	 of	 A#B	 one	 can	 infer	 A	 and	 one	 can	 infer	 B.	 In	 all	other	 cases,	 A#B	 is	 not	 true.	 What	 is	 gained	 by	 denying	 the	 very	possibility	 of	 such	 a	 connective,	 and	 insisting	 on	 the	 quantum-logical	one	instead?	Here	is	his	explication	of	the	significance	of	quantum	conjunction:	In	 effect,	 not	 allowing	 ourselves	 to	 conjoin	 all	 the	statements	we	 know	 to	 be	 true	means	 that	we	 have	what	amount	to	two	different	kinds	of	conjunction:	One	amounts	to	asserting	 statements	 in	 two	different	 “frames”	as	 I	 shall	call	 them	 (different	Boolean	 sub-logics);	 and	 the	other,	 for	which	we	reserve	the	and-sign,	is	conjunction	of	statements	which	lie	in	a	common	frame.23		Note	 that	 Putnam	 reserves	 the	 and-sign	 exactly	 for	 the	 “conjunction”	that	does	not	respect	classical	logic	and	designates	no	symbol	at	all	for	classical	conjunction.	That	 is,	Putnam	intends	to	replace	 the	classical	&	with	the	quantum	one.	But	why	not	at	least	leave	the	classical	‘&’	alone	and	introduce	a	new	symbol	for	the	quantum	operator?	And	what,	after	all,	does	the	quantum	conjunction	mean?	With	 regard	 to	 the	 classical	 conjunction,	 Putnam	 thinks	 that	certain	 aspects	 of	 quantum	 theory	 refute	 classical	 logic.	 But	we	 know																																									 							23	Putnam,	“Quantum	Mechanics”,	212.	
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that	 that	 cannot	be	 correct:	 given	 the	usual	 truth-functional	 semantics	of	 the	classical	connectives,	we	know	that	classical	 inferences	are	non-ampliative.	If	you	require	that	A	and	B	both	be	true	in	order	that	A	&	B	be	true,	and	that	 the	truth	A	and	B	separately	 follow	from	the	truth	of	A	&	B,	 then	 you	 have	 defined	 the	 classical	 conjunction	willy-nilly.	 It	 is	quite	irrelevant	what	“frames”	A	and	B	come	from.	You	can’t	derive	any	non-conjunctive	claim	after	conjunction	has	been	introduced	in	this	way	that	you	couldn’t	already	derive	without	it.	It	is	precisely	here	that	Putnam	introduces	a	new	and	unheralded	consideration:	predictive	value.	So	far,	as	 is	appropriate,	we	have	been	concerned	 with	 the	 truth	 of	 propositions	 and	 nothing	 else.	 We	 have	seen	that	we	can	stipulate	that	A	&	B	is	true	exactly	when	A	is	true	and	B	is	true	without	harm.	But	predictive	value	is	clearly	a	different	property	than	 truth.	 Putnam’s	 claim	 is	 then	 twofold:	 1)	 When	 using	 quantum	conjunction	of	propositions	we	are	concerned	not	with	 their	 truth	but	their	predictive	value	and	2)	there	are	some	pairs	of	propositions	such	that	they	cannot	both	simultaneously	have	predictive	value.		To	 sum	 up	 the	 situation,	 and	 contrary	 to	 Putnam’s	 convention	about	the	use	of	the	&	sign,	we	will	use	&	to	mean	classical	conjunction	and	∧	to	mean	 “quantum	 conjunction”.	 Now	 suppose	 that	 A	 and	B	 are	propositions	 such	 that	 their	 quantum	 conjunction	 A	∧	B	 is	 the	 zero	proposition,	 a	 zero-dimensional	 subspace.	 The	 conventional	 quantum	logic,	such	as	Finklestein’s	concludes	that	A	and	B	cannot	both	be	true,	and	a	fortiori	 cannot	both	be	known	 to	be	 true.	 In	other	words,	A	&	B	can	both	be	true	and	known.	But	according	to	Putnam,	sometimes	A	and	B	 can	 both	 be	 true	 and	 be	 known	 to	 be	 true.	 So	 A	 &	 B	 is	 true	 and	
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knowable.	Nonetheless,	the	unacceptability	of	A	∧	B	indicates	that	A	and	B	cannot	both	have	predictive	value.	If	A	makes	good	predictions,	then	B	cannot,	and	vice	versa.	In	essence,	Putnam	proposes	using	the	vocabulary	of	classical	logic	for	the	connectives	of	a	different	logic,	the	“logic	or	predictive	value”.	So	what	 does	 it	 mean	 that	 one	 true	 proposition	 about	 a	 system	 has	predictive	value	and	another	does	not?	Perhaps	 a	 slight	 variation	 of	 Putnam’s	 example	 will	 help.	 Once	again,	a	shutter	briefly	opens,	which	may	or	may	not	release	a	photon.	The	 shutter	 hole	 is	 covered	 by	 a	 polarizing	 filter	 that	 allows	 only	horizontally	 polarized	 light	 through.	 Some	 distance	 away	 is	 a	 second	polarizer	oriented	at	45°	from	the	first,	and	then	finally	a	screen.	The	shutter	 is	opened	and	a	 flash	occurs	on	the	screen.	What	can	we	infer	about	the	photon	from	this	result?	First,	 as	 Putnam	 notes,	 we	 can	 infer	 that	 a	 photon	 was	 indeed	released	while	 the	 shutter	was	open	at	 t0.	But	more	 than	 that,	we	 can	infer	 that	 the	 photon	 passed	 the	 first	 polarizer,	 and	 was	 therefore	horizontally	polarized	at	 that	 time.	Because	 the	photon	made	 it	all	 the	way	to	the	screen,	we	can	infer	that	it	passed	the	second	polarizer	at	t1,	and	thereafter	was	polarized	at	45°.	These	conclusions	are	unassailable	from	any	interpretive	point	of	view.	Passing	each	polarizer	counts	as	a	“measurement”	 of	 the	 photo’s	 polarization	 in	 the	 corresponding	direction.	But	Putnam’s	personal,	and	rather	idiosyncratic	insistence	that	the	interactions	we	call	“measurements”	simply	reveal	some	pre-interaction	property	of	the	measured	system	yields	another,	unexpected	conclusion.	
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It	means	that	at	the	time	t2-,	just	before	it	reached	the	second	polarizer,	the	photon	was	both	polarized	in	the	horizontal	direction	(as	confirmed	by	 passing	 the	 first	 polarizer)	 and	 polarized	 in	 the	 45°	 direction	 (as	confirmed	 by	 passing	 the	 second).	 But	 these	 two	 states	 are	 quantum-mechanically	incompatible!	Both	are	true,	but	the	quantum-conjunction	of	them	is	necessarily	false.	Putnam’s	 idea	 that	 measurements	 simply	 reveal	 pre-existing	values	 without	 disturbing	 the	 system,	 though,	 cannot	 survive	 more	experimentation.	 Adding	 yet	 another	 polarizer	 oriented	 in	 the	 45°	direction	would	not	change	the	output	data	at	all:	 the	same	number	of	photons	reach	the	screen.	In	other	words,	every	photon	that	passes	the	second	polarizer	will,	in	this	case,	pass	the	third,	which	is	oriented	in	the	same	 direction.	 However,	 if	 the	 third	 polarizer	 is	 oriented	 in	 the	horizontal	 direction,	 the	 number	 of	 photons	 will	 be	 reduced	 by	 half.	Apparently,	even	though	every	photon	that	reaches	the	second	polarizer	is	 horizontally	 polarized,	 not	 every	 photon	 that	 passes	 the	 second	polarizer	 is.	 The	 second	 polarizer	 can	 at	 least	 disturb	 the	 horizontal	polarization,	 even	 if,	 as	 Putnam	 insists,	 it	 leaves	 the	 45°	 polarization	intact.	This	 effect	 of	 the	 second	 polarizer	 even	 appears	 somewhat	startling	 if	 we	 change	 the	 third	 polarizer	 from	 horizontal	 to	 vertical.	Now,	with	the	second	polarizer	removed,	no	photons	at	all	get	through:	every	photon	that	passes	the	first	polarizer	is	horizontally	polarized	and	therefore	is	absorbed	by	the	vertical	polarizer.	But	re-inserting	the	45°	polarizer	 between	 these	 two—adding	 yet	 another	 filter	 between	 the	two	that	are	already	blocking	all	the	light—suddenly	allows	some	light	
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to	get	through!	The	beam	is	only	1/8	the	brightness	of	the	beam	with	no	polarizers	at	all,	but	more	light	gets	through	three	than	just	two	in	the	same	sequence.	Obviously,	the	middle	polarizer	alters	the	photons	that	pass	it.		The	idea	that	“measurements”	simply	reveal	pre-interaction	values	rather	 than	 create	 post-interaction	 values	 is,	 indeed,	 the	 hallmark	 of	Putnam’s	take	on	quantum	theory:		 Although	 the	 interpretation	 I	 have	 suggested	 is	 not	realistic	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 assuming	 a	 copy	 theory	 of	 truth	(metaphysical	 realism),	 or	 even	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 assuming	that	all	observables	have	determinate	values,	it	is	internally	
realistic	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 within	 the	 interpretation	 no	distinction	 appears	 between	 “measured	 values”	 and	“unmeasured	values”.24			But	 how	 can	 this	 picture	 be	 even	 internally	 coherent?	 Suppose	 that	 a	system	has	no	determinate	value	 for	an	observable,	but	 is	 subject	 to	a	“measurement	interaction”	for	that	observable.	Putnam’s	dictum	seems	to	 imply	 that	 there	 can	 be	 no	 outcome	 at	 all.	 For	 an	 outcome	 would	assign	a	“measured	value”,	which	would	clearly	be	distinct	from	the	pre-interaction	lack	of	any	value.		The	only	way	that	“quantum	logic”	could	come	to	the	rescue	here	is	 to	 insist	 that	 although	 the	 pre-measurement	 system	 had	 no	determinate	 value,	 and	 the	 post-measurement	 system	 does	 have	 a																																									 							24	Putnam,	“Quantum	Mechanics”,	217-218.	
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determinate	 value,	 you	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	 say	 both	 of	 these	 truths	together,	 and	 draw	 the	 obvious	 conclusions	 from	 them,	 because	 they	don’t	belong	to	“the	same	frame”.	 	And	this	is,	 indeed,	the	sort	of	thing	that	 some	 quantum	 logicians	 do	 say.	 But	 such	 a	 position	 is,	 to	 put	 it	bluntly,	 madness.	 	 If	 you	 can’t	 always	 talk	 about	 the	 pre-	 and	 post-measurement	 situations	 in	 the	 same	 breath,	 then	 you	 can’t	 always	assert	that	there	 is	no	distinction	between	the	values	 in	the	two	cases,	which	is	exactly	what	Putnam	wants	to	say!	And	anyway,	what	would	this	prohibition	on	drawing	conclusions	from	pairs	of	true	sentences	even	have	to	do	with	conjunction?	No	need	to	conjoin	A	and	B	to	infer	from	the	premise	set	{“The	pre-measurement	system	had	no	value	for	O.”,	“The	post-measurement	system	had	a	value	for	 O.”}	 the	 conclusion	 “The	 pre-measurement	 state	 differs	 from	 the	post-measurement	state	with	respect	to	the	value	of	O.”		In	 short,	 Putnam’s	 foray	 into	 his	 own	 version	 of	 quantum	 logic	ended	in	self-contradiction	and	failure.	Putnam	did	come	to	recognize	this.	By	the	time	of	his	his	reply	to	Michael	Redhead	in	Reading	Putnam,25	he	had	abandoned	quantum	logic,	never	 to	 take	 it	 up	 again.	 He	 came	 to	 see	 that	 one	 can’t	 just	 stipulate	how	 so-called	 “measurement	 interactions”	 work	 and	 then	 trim	 logic	itself	to	fit.	The	issue	facing	quantum	theory	is	bringing	“measurement	interactions”	 and	 “measurements”	 under	 the	 same	 physical	 laws	 and	principles	of	physical	analysis	as	everything	else.	 	What	 is	 left,	 then,	 is	the	 legacy	 of	 a	 research	 programme	 that	 did	 not	 pan	 out.	 There	 are	always	things	to	learn	from	such	projects,	insights	about	the	conditions																																									 							25	Bob	Hale	and	Peter	Clark	(eds.),	Reading	Putnam	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	1994).	
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for	 success	 and	 failure	 of	 a	 strategy.	 The	main	moral	 here	 is	 that	 the	analogy	 to	 the	 fate	 of	 Euclidean	 geometry	 was	 flawed	 from	 the	beginning.	 Abstract	 geometry	 has	 a	 clear	 physical	 counterpart	 that	 it	can	 be	 used	 to	 describe:	 space	 or	 space-time.	 But	 there	 is	 no	corresponding	physical	counterpart	of	the	logical	connectives.		Kant	 went	 wrong	 when	 he	 took	 something	 extramental—space	and	 time—and	 tried	 to	make	 them	merely	 the	 forms	 of	 our	 intuition.	Since	 space	 and	 time	are	not	 just	 in	our	minds,	 our	 theories	of	 space-time	 structure	 can	 get	 negative	 feedback	 from	 experience.	 But	 logical	structure	 is	 not	 like	 space-time	 structure:	 there	 is	 no	 physical	counterpart.	 As	 a	 result,	 physics	 cannot	 be	 simplified	 or	 improved	 by	changing	 logic.	Putnam	wandered	for	three	decades	 in	the	 labyrinth	of	quantum	logic,	but	he	finally	found	his	way	out	again.		 	
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